Previously on this blog, we reported on Miley Cyrus’s motion to dismiss a copyright infringement action against her and several co-defendants over the song “Flowers.”[1]  On March 18, 2025, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied the pop star’s motion, holding that, under the Copyright Act, investment company Tempo Music Investments, LLC (“Tempo Music”) has standing to sue to enforce its exclusive rights as a co-owner of the copyright in Bruno Mars’s song “When I Was Your Man.”

In denying Cyrus’s motion, the District Court emphasized the principles of divisibility and transferability of copyright ownership, writing that, under Section 201(d)(1) of the Copyright Act, “[t]he ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law.”[2]  Further, exclusive copyright rights “may be chopped up and owned separately, and each separate ownership of a subdivided exclusive right may sue to enforce that owned portion of an exclusive right, no matter how small.”[3]  The District Court emphasized that a co-owner of a copyright of a joint work may transfer her ownership interest without obtaining permission from the other co-owners and, citing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Tresóna Multimedia, LLC v. Burbank High School Vocal Music Association,[4] observed that “the question of standing to sue depends on the nature of the interest transferred.”[5]

The District Court rejected Cyrus’s contention that a single co-owner’s assignee merely holds non-exclusive copyrights and therefore lacks standing to sue for infringement.[6]  The court found Cyrus’s reliance on the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Tresóna and Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corporation[7] misplaced.[8]  

The District Court said that Cyrus misconstrued Ninth Circuit precedent by conflating ownership of “exclusive rights” with “exclusive ownership” of rights.  In attempting to restate the current law in the Ninth Circuit, the court noted that co-owners collectively own “exclusive rights” and that each co-owner owns an interest in those exclusive rights.[9]  The court observed that the Copyright Act requires that a plaintiff have an ownership interest in an exclusive right for standing to sue, not exclusive (i.e., sole) ownership of an exclusive right.[10]

The District Court looked to the Ninth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Corbello v. DeVito, that held that the appeals court’s 2008 decision in “Sybersound merely imposes a standing limitation on copyright assignees and licensees that reflects the basic principle that one cannot give away more than one’s share in a copyright – it need not, and should not, be extended to limit a co-owner’s ability to transfer unilaterally any exclusive copyright interests that he himself possesses.”[11]  Tempo Music alleged that Philip Lawrence—as a co-owner of exclusive rights in the song “When I Was Your Man,” which he co-wrote with Bruno Mars and others—transferred to Tempo Music his entire ownership interest in that song.[12]  Thus, the District Court found, as alleged, Tempo Music stands in Lawrence’s shoes and is a co-owner of exclusive rights in the song with standing to sue a non-owner of that song for infringement.[13]

The District Court emphasized that to hold otherwise would mean that a copyright could never be enforced if all original co-authors transferred their interests.[14]  Moreover, “such a limitation would diminish the value of jointly owned copyrights because buyers would be less interested in purchasing a copyright that they cannot enforce, thereby disincentivizing co-authorship and collaboration in works.”[15]

As noted previously on this blog (and by the Nimmer treatise), for nearly two decades the Ninth Circuit has conflated two distinct principles of copyright law:  (1) a co-owner’s ability to transfer its own exclusive rights in its share of the work, and (2) a co-owner’s inability to unilaterally transfer exclusive rights in the work as a whole.

In Corbello, the Ninth Circuit temporarily resolved this confusion, writing, “we made clear prior to Sybersound that copyrights are divisible and that a copyright owner can freely transfer any portion of his ownership interests in that copyright; after all, the plain language of [Section] 201(d) [of the Copyright Act] commands as much.”[16]  The Ninth Circuit noted that Sybersound’s emphasis “on the word ‘exclusive’ in these provisions cannot mean that only sole owners possess ‘exclusive’ rights, as such a rule would run directly contrary to another well-settled principle of copyright law: the right of one joint-owner to sue third-party infringers without joining any of his fellow co-owners.”[17] 

But in 2020, in Tresóna, the Ninth Circuit again misinterpreted the word “exclusive.”  Quoting Corbello’s language distinguishing Sybersound, the Ninth Circuit stated that because a co-owner cannot transfer more than he holds, a “third party’s right is ‘exclusive’ as to the assigning or licensing co-owner, but not as to the other co-owners and their assignees or licensees.  As such, a third-party assignee or licensee lacks standing to challenge the attempted assignments or licenses of other copyright owners.”[18]  This, Professor Nimmer contends, meant that plaintiff lacked standing to contest grants from fellow co-owners of the songs, not that a valid co-owner could not contest an unauthorized third-party’s use of the songs.[19]  Misconstruing this principle, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiff lacked standing because it obtained its rights from only one co-owner without the other co-owners’ consent.[20]  Professor Nimmer suggests that the appropriate result in that case would have been “to recognize plaintiff’s standing, subject to a duty to account to fellow co-owners.”[21]  Instead, Professor Nimmer says, the result in Tresóna “uproots the ‘well-settled principle of copyright law’ needed to maintain coherence in the field, which Corbello was attempting to uphold: the right of one joint-owner to sue third-party infringers without joining any of his fellow co-owners.”[22]  Notably, the Second Circuit has upheld this principle.[23]

In parsing the Ninth Circuit’s approach to divisibility and transferability principles, the District Court in Tempo Music—without acknowledging in any way that it was departing from Tresóna and reverting to the different approach of Corbello—aligns with a chorus of performing rights organizations and copyright scholars who previously cautioned that the Ninth Circuit’s “conclusion in Sybersound threatens to vitiate enforcement in general of joint works.”[24]  However, Ninth Circuit law remains unclear while the leading cases are in tension with one another.

It remains to be seen whether, if Cyrus’s standing loss is appealed, the Ninth Circuit will provide clarification on co-owner standing in copyright actions.  If the Ninth Circuit affirms the approach in Tresóna, there could be a circuit split with the Second Circuit, such that the Supreme Court could ultimately decide this issue.

[1] Tempo Music Investments, LLC v. Miley Cyrus, No. 2:24-CV-07910 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 16, 2024).

[2] Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4, Tempo Music Invs., LLC v. Miley Cyrus, No. 2:24-CV-07910 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 16, 2024) (Westlaw).

[3] Id.

[4] 953 F.3d 638, 645 (9thCir. 2020).

[5]  Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Tempo Music Invs., LLC v. Miley Cyrus, No. 2:24-CV-07910 (citing Tresóna Multimedia, LLC v. Burbank High Sch. Vocal Music Ass’n, 953F.3d 638, 645 (9thCir. 2020)).

[6] Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 5, Tempo Music Invs., LLC, No. 2:24-CV-07910.

[7] 517 F.3d 1137 at 1141 (9th Cir. 2008).

[8] Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 6, Tempo Music Invs., LLC, No. 2:24-CV-07910.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Id. at 7 (quoting Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015)).

[12] Order Denying Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 7, Tempo Music Invs., LLC, No. 2:24-CV-07910.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Corbello, 777 F.3d at 1065.

[17] Id.

[18] Tresóna Multimedia, LLC, 953F.3d at 645 (quoting Corbello, 777 F.3d at 1065).

[19] 1 Nimmer on Copyright §6.10[A][2][d] (2025). 

[20] Tresóna Multimedia, LLC, 953F.3d at 645.

[21] 1 Nimmer on Copyright §6.10[A][2][d] (2025).

[22] Id.

[23] Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2007).

[24] 1 Nimmer on Copyright §6.10[A][2][d] (2025).